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I N spite of the criticisms accruing from second-generation globaliza- 
tion studies, the term "globalization" 
is still surviving as a description of 
the widening, deepening, and speed- 
ing up of global interconnectedness 
and its impact on social change and 
social processes on a world scale. 
Rather than dying off, it appears that 
the term is becoming increasingly 
popular with leading politicians now 
using it as a matter of course to de- 
scribe the era we live in. Any event 
that appears on the world scene, for 
example, the events of 11 September, 
is now interpreted through the lens 
of globalization. 
INTRODUCTION 
At the level of the academy, global- 
ization studies originally heralded 
the globalization of communications, 
capital, and culture almost in that 
order, and the argument was made 
that these globalization forces were 
in effect decomposing the nation- 
state and the distinctiveness of indi- 
vidual societies. This argument was 
followed immediately by critiques of 
the notion of an all-encompassing 
globalization process, and the work 
in this mode emphasized uneven, 
complex, and contingent aspects of 
globalization. This article seeks to 
position itself outside either of these 
established approaches to the study 
of globalization. Where, in general, 
the trend has been to show how 
global processes affect the produc- 
tion of single events or social change 
at  the local or national level, I pro- 
pose to  reverse  t h e  t r end  by 
approaching an explanation of the 
global with specific reference to the 
national or local. Basically, I wish to 
ask the question, What can a study of 
Ireland do for understanding the 
phenomenon called globalization? 
rather than, How can globalization 
explain modern Ireland? In looking 
at  the specificity of Irish interna- 
tional and national dynamics and the 
linkages between cultural and eco- 
nomic processes a t  play in developing 
or imagining Ireland, we can see ten- 
dencies and  countertendencies 
toward globalizing dynamics. 
This special issue looks at  global- 
ization and democracy, and this arti- 
cle attempts to look a t  the link 
between the two by emphasizing the 
articulation of the cultural and the 
economic at  one and the same time in 
the production of Ireland in a global 
era. In short, the argument is that if 
we are to understand Ireland as a 
democratic nation, which has pro- 
duced itself in its current form within 
and around the dynamics of the 
global forces of capitalism, then we 
need to examine the phenomenon of 
Ireland through an analytical frame- 
work of cultural political economy. 
This should throw light on globaliza- 
tion tendencies and countertenden- 
cies from a specific location and, like- 
wise, show how culture implicates 
itself daily in the democratic pro- 
cesses that have produced Ireland. 
The most common reading of Ire- 
land and its current state of develop- 
ment is as a country that has done 
well in the era of globalization much 
as it had earlier done badly in the era 
of imperialism. Has there really been 
such a turnaround? What dynamics 
does this uncover that the emerging 
area of global studies needs to take 
on board? This article moves toward 
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an answer in three parts: it examines 
first, the problematic placing of Ire- 
land in the world; second, its con- 
stant (re)invention from a cultural 
political economy approach; and 
finally, its moving parts on the global 
scenes-its exiles and diasporas. I 
hope to contribute an Irish perspec- 
tive that avoids the difficulties asso- 
ciated with taking either a national- 
ist or postnationalist approach. 
PLACING 
We can usually, fairly unprob- 
lematically, place a given country in 
the global order in terms of its eco- 
nomic, political, or strategic impor- 
tance. Yet with Ireland, there is little 
agreement. Recently, a historian of 
the Americas, James Dunkerley 
(2000), sought to place Ireland 
"across the Atlantic" as it were. 
Dunkerley follows the tradition of 
"Atlanticism" (of Gilroy 1993) but is 
skeptical of "globalism." However, he 
argued for "the idea that Ireland is 
really an American country located 
in the wrong continent" (p. xxii). It 
was the Great Famine of the mid- 
nineteenth century and subsequent 
mass migrations that, supposedly, 
converted Ireland from an Atlantic 
country to an American one. This 
shift in cultural geography was sus- 
tained, according to Dunkerley, by a 
"superabundance of myth" (p. 37) but 
also validated by the one million 
Irish people who became U.S. citizens 
in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. From this perspective, it is 
easy to leap to another end of the cen- 
tury and in an economistic reading 
place Ireland as an outpost of the Sil- 
icon Valley. O'Hearn (1998) argued 
that U.S. computer and pharmaceuti- 
cal companies set the tone for the 
"Celtic Tiger" that transformed the 
economic, social, and  cu l tura l  
makeup of the country. Whether the 
economic growth of the Celtic Tiger 
set the scene for the cultural makeup 
of Ireland or the cultural makeup set 
the scene for the economic growth, 
we have here an argument that Ire- 
land can be historically and economi- 
cally placed as an American country 
or outpost. Recent Irish political and 
social reaction to the terrorist threat 
to the United States, coming from 
conservative and radical politicians 
alike, seems to confirm the view that 
Irish leaders and the vast majority of 
its people wish Ireland to be seen as 
an island extension of the United 
States. 
However, the American perspec- 
tive seems to ignore the facts of Brit- 
ish colonial rule in Ireland and the 
prevalence of a neocolonial pattern of 
development in the years since inde- 
pendence, itself of course geographi- 
cally incomplete. Not so long ago, the 
question, "Is Ireland a Third World 
Country?" (Caherty et al. 1992) could 
elicit a mainly positive, albeit quali- 
fied, response. The colonial legacy is 
seen as enduring, and all attempts to 
revise Irish history beyond the 
nationalist myths are rejected out of 
hand. For Robbie McVeigh (1998), 
t h i s  move to "decolonise" (or  
"postcolonise") Irish history is "factu- 
ally incorrect and intellectually dis- 
honest," and we are enjoined "to 
address the colonial legacy directly 
in order to transcend its negative and 
corrupting consequences" (p. 31). The 
latter may be simply a truism, but it 
does point to a blind spot of the new 
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postcolonial proglobalization per- 
spectives. Perhaps our colonial leg- 
acy has indeed left the Irish leader- 
ship and the Irish psyche prone to 
adopt a subordinate attachment to 
imperialistic powers. Alternatively, it 
could have left us with a national 
consciousness that sees the need to 
struggle against imperial, or exter- 
nal, forces. A cultural reading would 
suggest that both might well be pres- 
ent a t  one and the same time. How- 
ever, to return to the question of plac- 
ing Ireland, a t  the economic level, we 
are certainly not simply a Third 
World (itself an anachronism) coun- 
try. The Republic of Ireland is today 
one of the top performers in the Euro- 
pean Union-the once poor and 
underdeveloped Western periphery 
gave way to a thriving economy and 
cultural revival in the nineties, albeit 
with all the inequalities and prob- 
lematic long-term prospects all thriv- 
ing economies have. However, in 
terms of the debate as to whether Ire- 
land is a First World country of an 
American variety or a Third World 
country, rather than adjudicating 
between these admittedly rather 
starkly painted alternatives, I would 
like to use the debate as a marker for 
the analysis that follows. 
First, though, I wish to argue for a 
slightly different approach to global 
studies than the one that dominates 
in the literature. It would seem that 
from Malcolm Waters (1995, 2001) 
onward, global studies has been par- 
celled out into discrete economic, 
polit ical ,  social ,  and  cu l tura l  
domains or levels. While mindful 
that this may simply be a research or 
presentation strategy, I would be 
wary of going back to the old Marxist 
topographical analogy of levels. Soci- 
ety is simply not a building with a 
structure and a superstructure, or 
roof. This type of structural deter- 
minism has long since received a 
decent burial, and we would not 
really benefit from its resurrection 
within new global studies. The latter 
are at  their best when they analyze 
processes and flows, not bound by 
any determinisms and self-con- 
sciously eschewing disciplinary 
boundaries. If the global studies 
approach is to become a new para- 
digm in the fullest sense of the word, 
it will need to shake off the last ves- 
tiges of disciplinary ownership. In 
terms of economics, there are signs 
that Ireland is a satellite of the 
United States, given its dependency 
on U.S.-based companies. In terms of 
politics, there are indications of the 
same, as Irish leaders rush to sup- 
port the United States in its current 
difficulties. Likewise, cultural con- 
siderations feed into both economics 
and politics and have to be taken into 
account in placing Ireland. Hence, 
my suggestion to merge the political 
economy and  cu l tu ra l  s tud ies  
approaches. 
It would be possible to start off 
with the recent call by Ngai-Ling Sim 
(2000) to create a "cultural political 
economy," which was at  once sensi- 
tive to cultural or discursive dynam- 
ics and the role of economic and polit- 
ical factors. Nigel Thrift (2000) has 
also referred suggestively to the "cul- 
tural circuits of capital." Thinking 
about culture in Ireland (the Irish 
pub, Irish film, U2, Riverdance) and 
the new capitalism (software compa- 
nies, the e-economy) has made me 
even more conscious of the need to 
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build an integrated cultural political 
economy. The cultural element is 
clearly part and parcel of the Celtic 
Tiger, and the economic element cer- 
tainly has a strong cultural compo- 
nent. From the critique of political 
economy (not its existing disciplin- 
ary forms) and from a reflexive cul- 
tural studies (not an unthinking 
application), we may derive a critical 
optic that is adequate for the study of 
the complex reality we call Ireland 
today. All I would add is the need for a 
historical approach, only sketched 
here given constraints of length, 
which is necessary to make any sense 
of the current situation. This is, of 
course, a contested historical terrain, 
and my rendering is not the only one 
possible. 
INVENTING 
Cultural critic Declan Kiberd 
(1995) once wrote that "if Ireland had 
never existed, the English would 
have invented it" (p. 9). One could 
add, conversely, that because Eng- 
land existed, Ireland was forced to 
invent itself, much as what the West 
knows as the Orient and Islam are 
inseparable from Western dis- 
courses. It is common now to under- 
stand that nationalism is indeed, in 
Hobsbawn's words, an "invented tra- 
dition" (Hobsbawn and Ranger 1983) 
or an "imagined community" (Ander- 
son 1983). However, it would seem 
that in the era of globalization, this 
approach has great validity for Ire- 
land in particular. What passes for 
Irish culture today-the musical 
dance show Riverdance, t h e  
supergroup U2, or the ubiquitous 
global Irish pub-does not spring 
from the eternal wells of the Irish 
soul. Rather these phenomena are, to 
a large extent, manufactured by the 
global cultural industry. They reflect 
fully all of the hybridity, syncretism, 
a n d  even a rguably  t h e  post- 
modernism typical of the cultural 
political economy of globalization. If 
globalization can be said to have pro- 
duced a "world show case of cultures" 
(Featherstone 1995,13), then on this 
stage, Ireland has achieved a para- 
digmatic position. Ireland today, or a t  
least Dublin, is witnessing a culture- 
led process of regeneration and inser- 
tion into globalization in terms more 
favorable than could be expected 
from its economic weight. In fact, the 
two may well be linked-it is perhaps 
because of Ireland's economic light- 
ness that it may have gone into over- 
dr ive in  t e rms  of i t s  cu l tura l  
production. 
Historically, Ireland gained its 
partial independence from Britain in 
1921. It was not until the Wall Street 
crash of 1929 and the Great Depres- 
sion of the 1930s that a consistent 
path of inward-oriented growth 
began. While De Valera's notions 
might today smack of right-wing 
romantic isolationism, his industri- 
alization policies did lay the basis for 
a more independent development 
strategy in Ireland. This process of 
conservative modernization can be 
compared to the "passive revolution" 
Antonio Gramsci (1971) analyzed in 
Italy: a case of "molecular changes 
which in fact progressively modify 
the pre-existing composition of forces 
and hence become the matrix of new 
change" (p. 109). That new process of 
change occurred in the late 1950s, as 
protectionism gave way to free trade 
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and inward-oriented growth turned 
into outward-oriented growth. As T. 
K. Whitaker (1973), the architect of 
the post-1958 turn toward foreign 
loans and investments, put it a t  the 
time, "there is really no choice for a 
country wishing to keep pace materi- 
ally with the rest of Europe" (p. 415). 
So, Ireland joined the European Eco- 
nomic Community in 1973, and the 
removal of protectionism proceeded 
at full pace. 
When Ireland "joined" Europe in 
1973, it was very much as a poor rela- 
tion and major beneficiary of all the 
structural funds made available for 
less developed regions. I t  seemed 
that Ireland was exchanging self- 
reliance for dependency in a willful 
shift away from the independence 
movement ethos. As Denis O'Hearn 
(1998) put it, "a country which had 
virtually clothed and shod itself in 
1960 imported more than 71 per cent 
ofits clothingin 1980" (pp. 41-2). This 
shift away from indigenous industry 
toward transnational investment 
operated across the board. It coin- 
cided with a period in which U.S. 
transnational corporations were 
seeking profitable, high-tech loca- 
tions, particularly ones that would 
offer them access to the lucrative 
European market. The outward-ori- 
ented growth orientations led to 
mass unemployment as national 
industries collapsed, but by the 
1990s, a new era  of prosperity 
seemed to begin. Officially, the boom 
began in 1994, when in an obscure 
European investment assessment 
bulletin, the U.S. investment bank 
Morgan Stanley asked, perhaps 
tongue in cheek, whether there was a 
new Celtic Tiger about to join the 
family of east Asian tiger economies. 
So the Celtic Tiger (the myth feed- 
ing the real economic advances) 
emerged just when globalization was 
beginning to make itself felt in ear- 
nest. This does not mean that global- 
ization produced the Celtic Tiger, 
whose origins lay, as we saw in the 
bare outline, in a series of economic 
transformations going back to the 
1920s. And while the Irish boom may 
be real enough, i t  has its limits: 
growth rates are half those experi- 
enced in east Asia during the growth 
phase, and its sustainability is seri- 
ously in question given the limited 
base of the growth sector. Depend- 
ency on the whims and market sus- 
ceptibility of the transnational sector 
(essentially the computing and phar- 
maceutical sectors) is even greater 
than in the 1970s insofar as in the 
mid-1990s, this sector accounted for 
three-quarters of value added in 
manufacturing. A handful of com- 
puter companies, such as the giant 
processor manufacturer Intel, liter- 
ally hold the key to sustained growth 
rates in Ireland. As the United States 
now moves into a slowdown if not a 
full-blown recession, the Celtic Tiger 
is beginning to look distinctly more 
fragile than it did a couple of years 
ago. Indeed, by late 2001, the Irish 
growth rate was officially described 
as flat. 
Going back to Ireland as an Ameri- 
can country and Ireland as a Third 
World country, what can we now say? 
Ireland does seem to be very much an 
American state, given its reliance on 
U.S. investments and its unthinking 
support for U.S. militarism abroad. 
Yet Ireland is very much still a Third 
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World country in terms of its condi- 
tions of structural dependency. Ire- 
land is perhaps more accurately 
described in terms of hybridity 
though, meaning mixed temporali- 
ties and a process of uneven develop- 
ment. This cutting-edge technology 
coexists with traditional social rela- 
tions to a large extent. Luke Gibbons 
(1988) wrote a while back that "the 
IDA [Irish Development Authority, 
which helped bring in foreign invest- 
ment] image of Ireland as the silicon 
valley of Europe may not be so far 
removed after all from the valley of 
the squinting windows" (p. 218), the 
latter an image of traditional rural 
Ireland. This image of uneven but 
combined development may serve as 
a useful and evocative backdrop for 
our analysis of the cultural political 
economy of contemporary Ireland. 
Observers of the contemporary 
cu l tu ra l  scene in  I re land  a r e  
impressed by its dynamism. Conser- 
vative politician Gemma Hussey 
(1995) in her book Ireland Today 
referred to a "new exuberance of self- 
expression which the country has 
never seen before" and noted the 
"new Irish appetite for expression of 
its own identity" (pp. 470-71). We get 
a picture of a pristine and whole 
national identity proudly reasserting 
itself. Insularity is left behind as Ire- 
land enters the world scene but 
remains in touch with its traditions. 
Hussey remarked how "traditional 
music has been revived in its many 
forms, and enthrals tourists as much 
as Irish people, who are themselves, 
amazed by its richness" (p. 484). 
From the touching tones of the trav- 
elogue, we receive an image of tradi- 
tion largely uncontaminated by 
unpleasant associations with a colo- 
nial past or a fierce anti-imperialist 
struggle. Faced with the "inexorable 
weakening of the Irish language" (p. 
471), which Hussey seemed to see as 
the main repository of tradition, Ire- 
land has been able to avoid "the pres- 
sure of Anglo-American media" (p. 
471) and construct for itself the emi- 
nently valuable commodity known as 
contemporary Irish culture. 
From the Left of the political spec- 
trum, we get a not dissimilar reading 
of Irish cultural political economy. 
Thus, Denis O'Hearn (1998) in his 
book Inside the Celtic Tiger referred 
to "Ireland's cu l tu ra l  revival  
throughout t he  Western world 
[which] was evidenced in the popu- 
larity of the musical Riverdance" (p. 
117) and also made an explicit link 
between "an apparently vibrant 
economy and a confident culture" (p. 
57). As with Hussey (1995), the 
parameters of the nation-state are 
taken for granted, and one could be 
forgiven for thinking that globaliza- 
tion was not part of the picture a t  all. 
Where the Left analysis differs from 
the conservative one is only in causa- 
tion, because its economism leads it 
to more or less read off the cultural 
transformations from the economic 
ones. Yet ultimately, we get no expla- 
nation as to why Ireland has been 
part of "a Pan-Celtic Revival in the 
years leading up to the millennium" 
and has lived "what amounts to little 
less than another Cultural Renais- 
sance" (Smyth 1997, 175), as a radi- 
cal cultural critic put it. If we are not 
to fall back on mystical notions of 
national culture, we must necessar- 
ily begin with the cultural political 
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economy of globalization in seeking 
an explanation. 
I find it helpful to start my alter- 
native reading with a travel story of 
my own. If you were to visit Ireland, 
you might wish to travel with "Ire- 
land's cheap fares airline," Ryanair. If 
you made a telephone booking, you 
would be politely put on hold and left 
listening to the rousing theme music 
from Riverdance, as much flamenco 
and Broadway as traditional Irish 
music. From this postmodern pas- 
tiche or melange, your thoughts 
might turn to the company itself. 
Ryanair is typical of the new hol- 
lowed-out company, whose brash 
manager Michael O'Leary is actually 
the company and epitomizes the new 
confident Irish entrepreneurial  
classes. It contrasts with the bureau- 
cratic, more formal national carrier 
Aer Lingus that still lingers in the 
statist era and claims massive com- 
pensation for its alleged losses fol- 
lowing 11 September. But you travel 
Ryanair and arrive in Dublin along 
with thousands of European week- 
end tourists keen to sample the 
delights of the fashionable Temple 
bar area. As you get to passport con- 
trol, there is a billboard with a lepre- 
chaun (a traditional icon of Irish folk- 
lore) and a caption that reads, "If you 
think this is an icon of traditional Ire- 
land you are away with the fairies." A 
small symbol in the corner of the bill- 
board indicates this is an advertise- 
ment for ICON, the marketing com- 
pany for the traditional global Irish 
cream liqueur Bailey's. Can we really 
talk about Irish traditions anymore? 
It seems clear to me that globaliza- 
tion has radically redefined what we 
know as tradition. But then tradition 
was always invented. It was invented 
in the Ireland of the 1920s, the 1960s, 
and the 1990s. In the 1920s, as  
Declan Kiberd (1995) put it, the coun- 
try engaged in "the reconstruction of 
a national identity, beginning from 
the first principles all over again" 
(p. 286). De Valera and the founders 
of the national Irish state were in the 
business of constructing a modernity 
based on tradition. To refer to tradi- 
tion or cultural authenticity today 
makes little sense when we realize 
how pragmatic an affair the con- 
struction of a national identity is. In 
the 1960s, there was a reconstruction 
based on transnational values, first 
American and later European. Then 
in the 1990s, there was another 
reconstruction of Irish identity 
within global parameters. The dance 
of Riverdance, the music of the 
Chieftans, and the new Irish film 
cannot be understood as national cul- 
tural forms. They may be partly con- 
stituted locally, but it is with refer- 
ence to a global cultural market: they 
are local cultural keys turning global 
locks. 
I can only conclude by rejecting 
any essentialist notion of Irishness 
that is fixed from time immemorial. 
Neither Irish culture nor Irish iden- 
tity can be seen as self-contained, 
immutable, or closed. A new state of 
flux, typical of postcolonialism and 
globalization, opens up a new era of 
more fluid and uncertain construc- 
tion of cultural identity. This is also 
manifest a t  the political level- 
where the future of the island is, as 
always, uncertain. There is hardly a 
comfortable situation of cultural 
diversity being constructed where 
gender, ethnicity, and religious 
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conflicts become safely defused. Ire- 
land's culture is currently showing a 
more threatening side. Current rac- 
ism around the issue of immigration 
and refugees highlights some of the 
more worrying sides of the uncer- 
tainty we now face. This is hardly the 
positive scenario of Gemma Hussey 
(1995), for whom insularity has been 
replaced by "the confidence of an out- 
ward-looking young generation" (p. 
484). 
MOVING 
Cultural critic Terry Eagleton 
(1997) once wrote that while on one 
hand, Ireland signifies "roots, belong- 
ing, tradition," i t  also spells a t  the 
same time "exile, diffusion, globality, 
diaspora" (p. 11). We could posit that 
Ireland was alwayslalready part of 
the story of globalization, which 
would mean pushing back its conven- 
tional temporal origins. Being Irish 
was always associated with move- 
ment, even while being a t  home. Irish 
migration and the substantial Irish 
diaspora in different parts of the 
globe meant that Irishness was in a 
very real sense a globalized identity. 
That was the case a t  the last turn of 
century, but now, in the era of global- 
ization, migration is not so prevalent 
or economically necessary. I t  is per- 
h a p s  i ronic ,  t h e n ,  t h a t  today 
Irishness is finding confident home- 
grown roots and that home has a cer- 
tain stability to it. Irish presidents 
recently (Robinson and McAleese) 
have foregrounded the wish to bring 
the diaspora home, culturally and 
politically, if not physically. The confi- 
dence of Irishness on the island of 
Ireland today has even led to intense 
hostility to today's migrants created 
by globalization-the asylum seek- 
ers and refugees. 
Movement in the nineteenth cen- 
tury meant dislocation, rupture, and 
trauma in Ireland. It was associated 
with the famine, the British landlord, 
and unemployment. Emigration was, 
indeed, the national trauma. Today, 
movement means travel, working 
abroad, or coming home. The Irish 
media portray its citizens as the 
'Young Europeans": computer liter- 
ate, confident citizens of the world. 
Migration, then, cannot have a sim- 
ple meaning as a symptom of global- 
ization. It can signify expulsion or, as 
in Ireland today, success. The dias- 
pora was once an integral element of 
Irish identity. Today there is a move 
to bring i t  home, but home is not 
what i t  used to be. The Ireland of 
today has seen the full effect of 
deterr i tor ia l izat ion of cul ture .  
Observer Fintan 07Toole (2000) 
noted that a t  once "US culture is 
itself in part an  Irish invention" and 
that "Irish culture is inconceivable 
without America" (p. 12). Fluidity 
and hybridity have always been part 
of the Irish condition, but today, this 
occurs under the inescapable aegis of 
the United States, not some fuzzy, 
indistinct era of globalization. 
Ireland was always part ofbroader 
flows of people and ideas; it was 
always globalized, and i t  was always 
a floating signifier. National tradi- 
tion was located as much in the dias- 
pora as a t  home. And home today, as 
the accelerated movement of global- 
ization takes effect, is reinstated in 
the global Irish family our politicians 
call the diaspora. National identity is 
translated and appropriated by the 
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new global culture. When U2 refer to 
the famine, they do so in a way that 
makes i t  part of the new global his- 
tory in the making. What might 
make a n  interesting analogy to 
extend this analysis would be John 
Urry's (2000) concept of sites of "pure 
mobility" (p. 63). For Urry, society is 
today replaced by mobility, with such 
icons as the airport becoming truly 
"non-places." What if Ireland were to 
be conceived as a place of pure mobil- 
ity, dominated by movement and flu- 
idity? Though only an  analogy, and 
one that cannot be stretched too far, it 
may help us understand why Ireland 
is significant for an understanding of 
globalization, too often read from the 
perspective of stable, settled, and 
dominant world powers. 
CONCLUSION 
It would seem that the cultural 
political economy of Ireland might 
take us beyond the stark American 
and Third World options for placing 
Ireland. We cannot retreat to an 
essentialist notion of Irishness exist- 
ing since time immemorial. The cul- 
tural political economy of Ireland has 
never been self-contained, immuta- 
ble, or closed. The era of globaliza- 
tion, coinciding in Ireland with that 
of a postcolonialism, which put the 
British shadow firmly behind, has 
created the new context for Irish 
development. And yet Ireland was 
always part of a world of flows, never 
static, never fixed. The elements of 
uncertainty and  undecidability, 
which many see as pertaining to 
globalization andlor postmodernity, 
have always been Ireland's lot. We 
cannot ,  i n  I re land,  produce "a 
finished image of finished reality" 
(Smyth 1997, 67) because i t  has 
always been in flux. To engage with 
such a society, a novelist or short 
story writer is necessarily "con- 
strained to open meaning up rather 
than close i t  down," (Smyth 1997,67) 
as one cultural critic put it. The social 
and political scientist can hardly do 
otherwise. 
A recent International Studies 
Association conference contained 
presentations that referred to global- 
ization and the "preservation of local 
identity" in Ireland (White 2001). Ire- 
land is seen as one of those states 
that have "taken advantage of the 
new opportunities afforded by con- 
temporary globalization" (White 
2001), and the conclusion is that "the 
Irish have culturally escaped from a 
parochial sense of nationalism and 
become a proud member of the inter- 
national community" (White 2001). 
While capturing something of what 
is happening in Ireland today, I think 
i t  is clear, in the light of my analysis 
above, why this approach is insuffi- 
cient. I t  seems to buy in totally to the 
ideology of globalization: if we take 
advantage of it, we can escape paro- 
chial  nationalism. I t  was  t h u s  
patronizing politics I sought to con- 
test in declaring a t  the start that this 
article was neither nationalist nor 
postnationalist. Many social groups 
in Ireland, many women especially, 
have always contested the smug con- 
servative self-serving myths of Irish 
na t iona l i sm.  Pos tna t i ona l i s t  
accounts that imply that we have 
moved into a sea of tranquillity 
where all conflict will be peacefully 
resolved in Brussels or Washington 
are  also problematic. Ultimately, 
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w h a t  t h e  Irish case s tudy  shows u s  is  
t h a t  t h e  world is  a more complex 
place t h a n  a simple binary opposition 
of "Jihad versus McWorld" (Barber 
1995). 
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Democracy and the 
Transnational Capitalist Class 
By LESLIE SKLAIR 
ABSTRACT: While globalization means many different things to 
many different people, there is growing consensus that capitalist 
globalization is its most powerful contemporary form. This article ar- 
gues that capitalist globalization, and thus effective power in the 
global system, is increasingly in the hands of a transnational capital- 
ist class (TCC) comprising four fractions: those who own and control 
the major corporations and their local affiliates, globalizing bureau- 
crats and politicians, globalizing professionals, and consumerist 
elites. The TCC engages in a variety of activities that take place at  all 
levels, including community, urban, national, and global politics, and 
involve many different groups of actors. Two sets of questions are ad- 
dressed: (1) What forms do these activities take? and (2) Do they en- 
hance or undermine democracy? The role of the TCC is analyzed 
through brief case studies on Codex Alimentarius and the global to- 
bacco industry. 
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